심리학의 원리 심리학의 원리2のソースを表示

<br> And similarly of the attribute of continuity; it gives its own kind of unity to the self--that of mere connectedness, or unbrokenness, a perfectly definite phenomenal thing--but it gives not a jot or tittle more. But in our own account the medium is fully assigned, the herdsman is there, in the shape of something not among the things collected, but superior to them all, namely, the real, present onlooking, remembering, 'judging thought' or identifying 'section' of the stream. These things are a present self and a self of yesterday. Jay And Americans 솔로 보컬을 확립시킨 미국 신진 코러스의 인기 가수. Our remoter spiritual, material, and social selves, so far as they are realized, come also with a glow and a warmth; for the thought of them infallibly brings some degree of organic emotion in the shape of quickened heart-beats, oppressed breathing, or some other alteration, even though it be a slight one, in the general bodily tone. Just so, common-sense insists, there must be a real proprietor in the case of the selves, or else their actual accretion into a 'personal consciousness' would never have taken place. But, for a time at least, we can still express without any such hypotheses that appearance of never-lapsing ownership for which com<br>s<br> <br>e<br>.<br>The unity into which the Thought--as I shall for a time proceed to call, with a capital T, the present mental state--binds the individual past facts with each other and with itself, does not exist until the Thought is there. Self of the present moment, melting into it by slow degrees; and we get a still stronger bond of union. Until very recent years it was supposed by all philosophers that there was a typical human mind which all individual minds were like, and that propositions of universal validity could be laid down about such faculties as 'the Imagination.' Lately, however, a mass of revelations have poured in, which make us see how false a view this is. This to my mind would be a more satisfactory explanation of this class of illusions than any of those given by previous authors, were it not again for what happens in the skin. This page looks much smaller to the reader if he closes one eye than if<br>h eyes<br> <br>.px;"><br> The ear and eye are comparatively minute organs, yet they give us feelings of great volume. And if from the one point of view they are one self, from others they are as truly not one but many selves. We hear from our parents various anecdotes about our infant years, but we do not appropriate them as we do our own memories. The sense of our own personal identity, then, is exactly like any one of our other perceptions of sameness among phenomena. Let the reader try this with any word on this page. We may immediately call it right and intelligible so far as it posits a past time with past thoughts or selves contained therein--these were data which we assumed at the outset of the book. Give time enough, and all sentient things ought, at this rate, to end by assuming an identical mental constitution--for 'experience,' the sole shaper, is a constant fact, and the order of its items must end by being exactly reflected by the passive mirror which we call the sentient organism. Similarly at the so-called 'materializing séances' which fraudulent mediums give: in a dark room a man sees a gauze-robed figure who in a whisper tells him she is the spirit of his sister, mother, wife, or child, and f<br> <br> <br>n<br>.<br> As well might he confound Paul's body, which he only sees, with his own body, which he sees but also feels. To the usual empiricist explanation of personal consciousness this is a formidable reproof, because all the individual thoughts and feelings which have succeeded each other 'up to date' are represented by ordinary Associationism as in some inscrutable way 'integrating' or gumming themselves together on their own account, and thus fusing into a stream. Purkinje, Mach, and Breuer are the authors to whom we mainly owe the explanation of the feeling of vertigo. The countless empirical maxims of every-day life,  rentry.co the embodiment as they are of the inherited and organized sagacity of many generations, become wholly incompetent to guide us; and nothing which any one may do ought ever to occasion surprise. The psychologist, looking on and playing the critic, might prove the thought wrong, and show there was no real identity,--there might have been no yesterday, or, at any rate, no self of yesterday; or, if there were, the sameness predicated might not obtain, or might be predicated on i<br>ficien<br>ounds.